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PETITIONERS' BRIEF
I. BASEBALL'S EXEMPTION FROM SECTION ONE OF THE SHERMAN
ANTITRUST ACT APPLIES TO THE NATIONAL LEAGUE'S DECISION
TO DENY THE SALE AND TRANSFER OF A FRANCHISE.
The National League's decision to deny the purchase and
transfer of the Philadelphia Phillies is exempt from section one of
the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
See Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). Contrary to the holding of the Twelfth
Circuit, (R.App.21), the exemption is not limited to the reserve
clause, rather it is applicable to the entire business of baseball, in-
cluding restrictions on franchise transfers.1 Toolson v. New York
Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953); Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn,
569 F.2d 527, 541 (7th Cir.) (finding that "[t]he Supreme Court
has held three times that 'the business of baseball' is exempt from
the federal antitrust laws"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
This Court has explicitly reaffirmed baseball's exemption from
the antitrust laws. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 273-74 (1972);
Too/son, 346 U.S. at 357. Moreover, this Court has recognized that
baseball is entitled to unique status and treatment under the anti-
trust laws. In each of three separate cases this Court recognized the
unique characteristics and needs of baseball while clearly defining
and reaffirming the exemption. See Radovich v. National Football
League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); United States v. International Boxing Club,
348 U.S. 236 (1955); United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955).
This Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of stare decisis
in upholding the exemption. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282; Tooson, 346
U.S. at 357. This Court has also held that only Congress should
modify such a long standing rule of law and that Congress has ex-
amined, ratified and sanctioned baseball's antitrust exemption. See
Flood, 407 U.S. at 273-74; Radovich, 352 U.S. at 450; Shubert, 348 U.S.
at 230.
(167)
1. The reserve system required players to contract with their clubs for a speci-
fied period, gave the clubs latitude to assign player contracts and subjected players
to renewal at predetermined minimum salaries. FRood4 407 U.S. at 259 n.1.
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A. This Court's Repeated Determinations That Baseball Is
Exempt from the Antitrust Laws Is Controlling.
Over seventy years ago this Court exempted baseball from the
antitrust laws, thereby precluding claims such as those brought by
the Phoenix Phillies herein. Federal Baseball 259 U.S. at 201. This
Court reaffirmed that holding in Toolson, noting that Congress had
not seen fit during the ensuing thirty-one years to establish through
legislation that the antitrust laws would apply to baseball. 346 U.S.
at 356-57. That reasoning was expressly endorsed yet a third time
by this Court in Flood v. Kuhn. 407 U.S. at 282. In Flood, this Court
stated that the baseball exemption "has been with us for half a cen-
tury, . . . heretofore deemed fully entitled to the benefit of stare
decisis. . . ." Id. Flood recognized the exemption as a considered
accommodation to the special issues facing baseball, stating that the
exemption operated "on a recognition and an acceptance of base-
ball's unique characteristics and needs." Id. Flood also established
that though baseball was engaged in interstate commerce, it should
remain exempt from the antitrust laws due to stare decisis and sub-
stantial policy reasons such as industry reliance and legislative in-
tent. Id.
This Court has often emphasized that "the doctrine of stare de-
cisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law." Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) ("[Sjtare decisis is a
basic self-governing principle within the Judicial Branch, which is
entrusted with the sensitive and difficult task of fashioning and pre-
serving a jurisprudential system that is not based upon 'an arbitrary
discretion.' ") (citations omitted). "Any departure from the doc-
trine of stare decisis demands special justification." Arizona v. Rum-
sey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (emphasis added). The doctrine is of
greatest force when the Court construes legislation. See, e.g., Smith
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944). In Toolson, this Court upheld
baseball's antitrust exemption finding that "Congress had no inten-
tion of including the business of baseball within the scope of the
federal antitrust laws." Too/son, 346 U.S. at 357.
The burden borne by a party "advocating the abandonment of
an established precedent is greater where the Court is asked to
overrule a point of statutory construction." Patterson, 491 U.S. at
172. In the area of statutory interpretation, considerations of stare
decisis are paramount, where, like here, the "legislative power is im-
plicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we [the Court]
have done." Id. at 172-73 (citations omitted). To overturn a settled
point of statutory construction, the challenging party must prove
[Vol. II: p. 167
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that the established interpretation is unworkable or that the pur-
pose of the statute is frustrated. See id. The Phoenix Phillies cannot
meet such a burden in this case. Moreover, the record does not
reflect a single fact that would indicate that baseball's exemption is
unworkable or in contravention of the purpose of the Sherman Act.
B. This Court Has Clearly Held That Only Congressional Action
Can Bring Baseball Within the Scope of the Federal Antitrust
Laws.
In every case in which this Court has examined baseball's ex-
emption from the antitrust laws, this Court has directly expressed
that baseball's exemption must be upheld so long as Congress re-
fuses to enact legislation that would place baseball within the pur-
view of federal antitrust laws. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 283 (holding
that if any change to baseball's antitrust exemption is to be made, it
must be by legislative action); Radovich, 352 U.S. at 451 ("[A]s long
as the Congress continues to acquiesce we should continue to ad-
here to - but not extend - the interpretation of the Act made in
those cases."); United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 230 (1955) (if
baseball's exemption is to be amended "the appropriate remedy
lies with Congress"); Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357 ("Congress had no
intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of
the antitrust laws.").
1. Congress has acknowledged and sanctioned this Court's
determination that the business of baseball in general is exempt
from the antitrust laws.
This Court has concluded that Congress has no intention to
subject baseball to the reach of the antitrust laws. Toolson, 346 U.S.
at 357. Moreover, this Court has expressed "concern about the con-
fusion and retroactivity problems that inevitably would result with
the judicial overturning of Federal Basebal," due to the considerable
reliance placed upon the exemption by the baseball industry and
associated communities and municipalities. Flood, 407 U.S. at 284.
In Radovich, this Court also noted the possibility for a flood of litiga-
tion and harassment that would ensue in the baseball industry if
baseball's exemption were overturned judicially. Radovich, 352 U.S.
at 452. Such compelling policy reasons, based in the doctrine of
stare decisis, led the Flood Court to conclude that it would not over-
turn Federal Baseball and Toolson when "Congress, by its positive inac-
tion, has allowed those decisions to stand for so long and, far
19951
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beyond mere inference and implication, has clearly evinced a de-
sire not to disapprove them legislatively." Flood, 407 U.S. at 283-84.
Congress has actively considered amending the antitrust ex-
emption on numerous occasions, clearly evincing a desire not to
disapprove of baseball's exemption. Flood, 407 U.S. at 283. This
Court has, on several occasions, invited the Congress to overturn
baseball's exemption. See, e.g., id.; Radovich, 352 U.S. at 450; Shubert,
348 U.S. at 230; Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357. Nonetheless, between the
Toolson decision in 1953 and Flood in 1972, Congress witnessed the
introduction of more than fifty bills relative to the applicability of
the antitrust laws to baseball. Flood, 407 U.S. at 281. Of those bills,
the only ones to pass, acted to expand, not contract baseball's anti-
trust exemption. Id.
Congress has never seen fit to limit or repeal the exemption,
even though it has held numerous hearings over the years at which
the questions of the continuation and breadth of baseball's exemp-
tion have been debated at length. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 4994,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); H.R. Rep. No. 1094, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1992); H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
Moreover, Congress has acknowledged and sanctioned the breadth
of baseball's exemption from the antitrust laws. At a hearing before
the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee, baseball's blanket antitrust im-
munity was recognized, as was the power for owners to "use such
antitrust immunity as they see fit to either block or approve
franchise relocation." H.R Rep. No. 1094 at 2-3. In the same re-
port to the Subcommittee, baseball was recognized as a unique in-
stitution with "special public interest obligations" and not merely
another business. Id. at 5. Importantly, the Subcommittee received
testimony establishing that baseball's exemption from the antitrust
laws is "very important to baseball in terms of migration of
franchises" and is thus essential to the economic health and integrity
of the game. Id. at 7.
2. Congress, through active legislative consideration, has proven to be
the appropriate forum for modification of baseball's exemption.
This Court should adhere to its own well established precedent
and defer amending baseball's exemption to the legislature, espe-
cially when Congress is actively considering baseball's antitrust im-
munity. Shubert, 348 U.S. at 230 (if baseball's exemption is to be
amended "the appropriate remedy lies with Congress"). There are
currently several proposed bills pending before Congress relative to
baseball's exemption. See, e.g., H.R Rep. No. 4994, 103d Cong., 2d
[Vol. II: p. 167
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Sess. (1994). The bills consider limited revocation of the exemp-
tion, special provisions for the draft, the minor leagues, the Player's
Association and special protection for the "business of baseball."
See id. The bills also provide for the prospective application of
their provisions. The ability of Congress to conduct investigations
and inquiries concerning proposed or possibly needed statutes is
unique to the legislature and is a compelling reason for this Court
to yield to Congress on the issue of amending baseball's exemption.
See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544
(1963).
Congress has probed into the economic and policy consid-
erations behind baseball's antitrust immunity. Specifically, with re-
gard to franchise relocation, Congress, as recently as 1992, inquired
into the ultimate ability of the Commissioner of Baseball to stay a
franchise relocation in order to protect the fans and the commu-
nity. H.R. Rep. No. 1094 at 10. As a result of this exemption, base-
ball has a strong record regarding franchise stability. H.R. Rep. No.
4994 at 5. Congress recognized that baseball has not abused its an-
titrust exemption and consequently made no recommendation re-
garding remedial legislation.
Clearly, substantial policy reasons exist for the continuation of
baseball's antitrust exemption including franchise stability, the eco-
nomic interests of the community, preventing relocation solely for
the profit of an individual owner and the integrity of the "Great
American Game." Congress is the appropriate body for assessing
the validity of these policy issues and promulgating appropriate leg-
islation. See Portland Baseball Club, Inc. v. Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc.,
282 F.2d 680, 680 (9th Cir. 1980) ("[A]s we read Toolson and
Radovich the Supreme Court is still holding to the proposition that
if professional baseball is to be brought within the pale of federal
antitrust laws, the Congress must do it.").
C. Baseball's Exemption from the Antitrust Laws Applies to the
Entire Business of Baseball.
The entire business of baseball is exempt from federal antitrust
laws. Flood, 407 U.S. at 283; Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357; Federal Baseball,
259 U.S. at 206. Moreover, this Court explicitly stated in Radovich v.
National Football League, that baseball's unique exemption applies to
the business of baseball in general, and is not limited to baseball's
reserve system. 352 U.S. 445, 451 (1957) ("[W]e now specifically
limit the rule [exemption] there established to the facts there in-
volved, i.e., the business of organized professional baseball.");
1995]
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see also Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357; Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 207.
Questions of league structure and transfer relocation are part of
the business of professional baseball and are thus clearly under the
umbrella of baseball's exemption from federal antitrust laws.
Therefore, the National League's decision to deny approval of the
Phoenix Phillies' purchase and transfer of the Philadelphia Phillies
is protected from the scrutiny of the antitrust laws.
Federal Baseball, the case establishing baseball's exemption from
the antitrust laws, did not involve the reserve clause. See Finley, 569
F.2d at 546. The issue in Federal Baseball was whether the major
leagues could be held liable under the antitrust laws for refusing to
admit a franchise owned by the plaintiff, the owner of a team in a
competing league. Although the plaintiff alleged, among other
things, that the reserve clause was anti-competitive, Federal Baseball
was not a case in which the antitrust issue was the reserve clause;
rather, like this case, it was about whether baseball may decide with
whom and where it wants to play ball. This Court has never limited
baseball's exemption to the reserve clause. See Flood, 407 U.S. at
283; Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
This Court has applied the exemption to the entire business of
baseball and, until the Twelfth Circuit's decision, every circuit court
to have considered baseball's exemption has similarly held that the
entire business of baseball is exempt. Indeed, it is the entire "busi-
ness of baseball" and not just the reserve clause that is covered by
the doctrine of stare decisis.
The Seventh Circuit, in Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, in re-
jecting plaintiff's contention that-baseball's exemption is limited to
the reserve clause, concluded that "it appears clear from the entire
opinions of the three baseball cases, as well as from Radovich, that
the Supreme Court intended to exempt the business of baseball,
not any particular facet of that business, from the federal antitrust
laws." 569 F.2d at 541.
In upholding the dismissal of an antitrust complaint against
baseball that challenged, among other things, "the franchise loca-
tion system," the Eleventh Circuit concluded "the exclusion of the
business of baseball from the antitrust laws is well established. Each
of the activities appellant alleged as violative of the antitrust laws
plainly concerns matters that are an integral part of the business of
baseball." Professional Baseball Schools & Clubs, Inc. v. Kuhn, 693 F.2d
1085, 1085-86 (11th Cir. 1982). In Salerno v. American League of Pro-
fessional Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003, 1004-05 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971), the Second Circuit affirmed the dis-
[Vol. II: p. 167
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missal of antitrust claims by former American League umpires, cit-
ing the broad exemption that the entire business of baseball enjoys.
With particular reference to control over franchise location,
the First Circuit held that a minor league franchise could be
granted only by permission of the National Association of Profes-
sional Baseball Leagues. Triple-A Baseball Club Assocs. v. Northeastern
Baseball, Inc., 832 F.2d 214, 216 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
935 (1988). The First Circuit proclaimed that "[flor those not fa-
miliar with the Great American Game we point out that profes-
sional baseball has had a long-standing exemption from the
antitrust laws." Id. Finally, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal
of antitrust claims by a former minor league owner who objected to
major league franchises being located in his territory. Portland Base-
ball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 491 F.2d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding
dismissal of antitrust claim proper on authority of Food); accord Port-
land Baseball Club, Inc. v. Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc., 282 F.2d 680
(9th Cir. 1980).
This resoundingly clear rule of law has also been followed by
both federal and state courts. See, e.g., Postema v. National League of
Professional Baseball Clubs, 799 F. Supp. 1475, 1489 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(holding baseball's exemption immunizes baseball from antitrust
challenges to its league structure and its reserve system), rev'd on
other grounds, 998 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1993); Mid-South Grizzlies v. Na-
tional Football League, 550 F. Supp. 558, 565 (E.D. Pa. 1982) ("Unlike
professional baseball, professional football does not enjoy the good
fortune of being totally exempt from the antitrust laws.") (emphasis
added), aff'd, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1215 (1984); cf. Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n,
Inc., 541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (refusing to apply antitrust
exemption where league structure was not at issue); State v. Milwaukee
Braves, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 1, 15 (Wis.) (in rejecting the State of Wis-
consin's attempt to prevent a baseball franchise in that state from
relocating in Atlanta, the court held that baseball's exemption at
least protects agreements and rules that provide for the league
structure of professional baseball), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 990 (1966).
1. The Twelfth Circuit erred by limiting baseball's exemption to the
reserve clause.
The Twelfth Circuit erred in its interpretation of this Court's
clear precedent when it determined that baseball's exemption from
the antitrust laws applies only to the reserve system. (R.App.21).
The Twelfth Circuit relied upon Flood where the issue before the
19951
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Court was whether baseball's reserve system was exempt from the
application of the antitrust laws. 407 U.S. at 260. Contrary to the
Twelfth Circuit's conclusion that the Food decision limited the
"precedential value of Federal Baseball to disputes involving the re-
serve clause," (R.App.21), the Court in Flood held that it would ad-
here to the rule that professional baseball is exempt from the
antitrust laws. Flood, 407 U.S. at 285.
The Twelfth Circuit's reliance on Piazza v. Major League Base-
ball 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993), is also erroneous. (R.
App.21). Piazza is the only case to hold that baseball's exemption is
limited to the reserve clause. However, the Piazza court conceded
that the "physical relocation of a team and [b]aseball's decisions
regarding such a relocation could implicate matters of league struc-
ture, and thus be covered by the exemption." Id. at 441 (emphasis
added). Piazza, a district court case, is not binding upon this Court,
particularly when there is direct and substantial precedent to the
contrary. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 283-84; Radovich, 352 U.S. at 451;
Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357; Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 201. In a subse-
quent opinion, the Piazza court recognized that "[o]ther courts
considering the issue have concluded that Baseball's antitrust ex-
emption extends beyond the reserve system" and concluded that
"there is substantial ground for difference of opinion" regarding the
breadth of the exemption. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 836 F.
Supp. 269, 271 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (emphasis added).
2. The National League's decision to deny the transfer of the
Philadelphia Phillies to Phoenix is clearly within the purview of
baseball's antitrust exemption.
There is simply no legal support for the proposition espoused
by the Phoenix Phillies that the exemption is limited to the reserve
clause. (R.App.21). To the contrary, the National League's vote
and subsequent denial of the Phoenix Phillies' attempt to move the
Philadelphia Phillies to Phoenix is within baseball's exemption
from the antitrust laws. (R.App.18).
Moreover, baseball's exemption must apply to the National
League's decision to deny the transfer of the Philadelphia Phillies
as a necessary step to maintain the structure of professional base-
ball. See State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 1, 15 (Wis.)
("[T]he exemption at least covers the agreements and rules which
provide for the structure of the organization and the decisions
which are necessary steps in maintaining it."), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
990 (1966).
[Vol. II: p. 167
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Here, the activities alleged in the complaint fall squarely within
baseball's exemption and are protected from the scrutiny of the
antitrust laws as business activity directly related to the unique
needs of professional baseball. (R.2). The purchase, sale and relo-
cation of the Philadelphia Phillies, comprise matters of league
structure which are an integral part of the business of baseball and
are at the crux of baseball's exemption.
3. The National League's decision to reject Respondent's purchase of the
Philadelphia Phillies does not even implicate the antitrust laws.
Even if section one of the Sherman Act applied to the business
of baseball, the Phoenix Phillies' attempt to purchase the Philadel-
phia Phillies had no effect on competition and therefore cannot
give rise to an antitrust claim. Indeed, the law is clear that a re-
jected applicant to a professional sports league cannot invoke the
antitrust laws. See, e.g., Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National
Hockey League, 783 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 932
(1986). Moreover, the Phoenix Phillies agreed in their contract of
March 15, 1993, that the sale of the Philadelphia Phillies was contin-
gent upon the subsequent approval of the National League.
(R.App.16). In the instant case, the Phoenix Phillies attack the very
monopoly that they seek to join.
Courts routinely reject antitrust claims made by unsuccessful
applicants for franchises in every major professional sport except
baseball, where the issue has never arisen due to its antitrust ex-
emption. See Seattle Totems, 783 F.2d at 1347 (hockey); Mid-South
Grizzlies v. National Football League, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984) (football); Levin v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 385 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (basketball). At the heart of
each of these cases is the fundamental proposition that an appli-
cant for a franchise is not seeking to compete with the professional
league, but rather to join it. Absent an attempt to compete, there
can be no harm to competition and, thus, no antitrust violation.
Mid-South Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 785 ("Sherman Act liability requires
an injury to competition."); see also Levin, 385 F. Supp. at 152 ("The
law is well established that it is competition, and not individual
competitors, that is protected by the antitrust laws.").
In Mid-South Gizzlies, the owners of a World Football League
team brought an antitrust action against the National Football
League ("NFL") after their application for admission to the NFL
had been rejected. In affirming the trial court's decision in favor of
the NFL, the Third Circuit concluded that "[t]he Grizzlies have
1995]
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simply failed to show how competition in any arguably relevant
market would be improved if they were given a share of the NFL's
monopoly power." Id. at 787. In the instant case, there is no con-
ceivable argument that competition would be affected in Phoenix
where no other baseball franchises exist.
Similarly, in Seattle Totems Hockey Club, the Ninth Circuit held
that since the Totems were seeking to join and not compete with
the National Hockey League, there could be no implication of the
antitrust laws. 783 F.2d at 1350; accord Levin, 385 F. Supp. at 152
(plaintiffs seeking to be partners in the operation of a sports league
for plaintiffs' profit had no anti-competitive injury, and thus claim
did not implicate the antitrust laws). The application of the forego-
ing cases to the case at bar is clear: this Court need not consider the
contours of baseball's antitrust exemption where the actions com-
plained of are not anti-competitive in nature and do not even impli-
cate the antitrust laws.
II. THE NATIONAL LEAGUE Is A SINGLE ENTITY CONSISTING OF
FOURTEEN TEAMS AND Is THEREFORE INHERENTLY INCAPAPBLE
OF CONSPIRING WITH ITSELF IN VIOLATION OF SECTION ONE OF
THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT.
A determination by this Court that baseball is properly exempt
from antitrust liability renders the issue of whether the National
League constitutes a single entity moot. However, if this Court de-
cides that baseball is no longer exempt from antitrust liability, the
National League should nonetheless be characterized as a single
entity and therefore incapable of conspiring with itself in violation
of section one of the Sherman Act. As the following arguments
demonstrate, the district court in the case subjudice properly found
the National League to constitute a single entity. Accordingly, the
decision of the Twelfth Circuit should be reversed.
A. Section One of the Sherman Act Was Not Designed to Police
Internal Decisions of a Single Entity.
Plaintiff's antitrust claim is based, in part, on section one of
the Sherman Antitrust Act.2 The central purpose of the Sherman
Act is to protect "the economic freedom of participants in the rele-
vant market." Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Coun-
2. Section one of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part that, "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in the re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several states ... is declared to be illegal."
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
[Vol. II: p. 167
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cil of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983). To prove a section one
violation a plaintiff must show proof of a concerted action by a plu-
rality of actors to impose an unreasonable restraint on trade. Id. at
769; see also City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d
268, 274 (8th Cir. 1988).
Although many elements must be satisfied in order to state a
section one claim, the fundamental threshold issue in any section
one case is the requirement that the challenged conduct involve
concerted action between separate legal entities. Volvo N. Am. Corp.
v. Men's Int'l Professional Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 70 (2d Cir.
1988). Unilateral actions of a single entity do not give rise to anti-
trust liability under section one of the Sherman Act. Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984).
Section one targets concerted activity as opposed to unilateral
activity because "[c]oncerted activity is inherently fraught with anti-
competitive risk. It deprives the marketplace of the independent
center of decision making that competition assumes and demands.
In any conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued
their own interests separately are combining to act as one for their
common benefit." Id. at 768-69. Classifying the teams of the Na-
tional League as multiple entities would not further the purposes of
section one. When making internal decisions, the teams of the Na-
tional League are not separate economic actors pursuing separate
economic interests, so agreements among them do not suddenly
bring together economic power that was previously pursuing diver-
gent goals. Rather, agreements and coordination between teams
are necessary in order for the League to compete effectively. Inter-
nal decisions to implement a single firm's policies, such as franchise
relocation decisions, do not raise the antitrust dangers that section
one was designed to police.
Nonetheless, characterizing the National League as a single en-
tity will not act as a bar to all antitrust liability. The National
League would still remain subject to the antitrust provisions of sec-
tion two of the Sherman Act prohibiting predatory monopolistic
behavior. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
1995]
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B. Characterizing the National League as a Single Entity Is
Wholly Consistent with Antitrust Precedent.
1. The functional test for determining plurality set forth in Copperweld
applies to the characterization of the National League.
While this Court has not had the opportunity to decide
whether a professional sports league should be regarded as a single
entity, this Court in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467
U.S. 752 (1984), set forth a new and functional standard for deter-
mining plurality under section one of the Sherman Act. This new
standard is wholly applicable to the case at bar. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Twelfth Circuit, in deciding that the National League
did not constitute a single entity for the purposes of applying sec-
tion one, erred in at least two respects. First, the Twelfth Circuit
inappropriately applied a narrow reading of this Court's decision in
Copperweld. The Twelfth Circuit's holding would wrongly limit Cop-
perweld's applicability to only parallel factual situations. Secondly,
the Twelfth Circuit relied upon discredited precedent by applying
case law based on the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine which
this Court reversed when it ruled in Copperweld.
In Copperweld, a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary
were found to be incapable of conspiring under section one of the
Sherman Act. The rationale behind this rule was based, in large
part, on the parent corporation's control over its subsidiary. Id. at
777. While it is true that Copperweld dealt specifically with a wholly
owned subsidiary, the focus was on the economic substance, control
and unity of such an arrangement, not merely its parent-subsidiary
form. Id. at 767. Furthermore, it was unnecessary for this Court to
apply the new standard to any other business arrangement because
the sole issue before the Court was specifically limited to the appli-
cation of section one of the Sherman Act to a parent and its wholly
owned subsidiary.
It is significant to note, however, that post-Copperweld courts
have found that a subsidiary need not be wholly owned by a parent
to apply this Court's Copperweld analysis. See, e.g., Computer Identics
Corp. v. Southern Pac. Co., 756 F.2d 200, 204-05 (1st Cir. 1985) (indi-
cating non-wholly owned affiliates may act as one entity "both in
fact and in action"); Aspen Title & Escrow, Inc. v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., 677 F.
Supp. 1477, 1486 (D. Or. 1987) (granting summary judgment
under section one of Sherman Act in case involving less than full
ownership based on inability to conspire); Satellite Fin. Planning
Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Wilmington, 633 F. Supp. 386, 395 (D. Del.
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1986) (finding Copperweld applicable notwithstanding fact that par-
ent does not completely own subsidiary).
2. This Court expressly rejected the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine
relied upon by the Twelfth Circuit.
To contend that Copperweld does not apply to the case at bar is
to elevate form over substance. In resting the determination on the
substance of the arrangement rather than the form, this Court spe-
cifically rejected the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine previously
used by courts to find a section one conspiracy between entities
with certain ownership characteristics. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 777.
"The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine looks to the form of an
enterprise's structure and ignores reality." Id. at 772. Courts that
had relied on the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine before this
Court's decision in Copperweld include the Ninth Circuit in Los Ange-
les Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d
1381, 1391 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984), and the Sec-
ond Circuit in North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670
F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982). The business
arrangements in the cases under which the intra-enterprise conspir-
acy doctrine developed differ materially from the business of base-
ball. Individual National League teams cannot, and do not make
the League product. Interdependence among the teams is essen-
tial to create a baseball game, whereas other business arrangements
that produce a tangible product do not depend upon joint action
for their existence.
The Twelfth Circuit reversed the district court on the single
entity issue based primarily on the decision in Los Angeles Memorial.
(R.App.22). The validity of Los Angeles Memorial, a pre-Copperweld
case, is suspect as it was premised on a finding of concerted action
that was later rejected by this Court. After Copperweld, the fact that
League member clubs are separately organized and allowed a sig-
nificant degree of operational autonomy should have little rele-
vance to the question of single entity status.
3. The substance and form of the National League are indicative of a
single entity comprised of fourteen member teams.
In Copperweld this Court acknowledged that while in form a par-
ent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary were legally distinct
entities, in substance they operated as a single integrated enterprise
and therefore constituted a single entity. 467 U.S. at 771-74. A re-
view of the limited stipulated facts contained in the record evi-
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dences a similar result. While the individual teams of the National
League are, in form, legally distinct from one another, substantively
the member teams operate as a single integrated enterprise.
The structure of the National League allows the member teams
to manage their day-to-day affairs. This includes such matters as
individual stadium ticket sales and local broadcasting rights.
(R.App.8). Member teams also possess the ability to make certain
decisions regarding franchise personnel, including decisions affect-
ing players and coaches. See Los Angeles Memorial, 726 F.2d at 1390.
The National League, like a partnership, allows its members to run
less important affairs. However, such practices do not account for a
determination that the member teams are separate entities. Impor-
tant or significant decisions are still left to the League as a whole
without an individual team having independent authority to act. In
determining the single entity status of a parent company and its
wholly owned subsidiary, this Court relied on the control and "com-
plete unity of interest" present rather than the number of legal enti-
ties involved. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771. A parent and wholly
owned subsidiary were found to constitute a single entity because
"[t] heir objectives are common, not disparate; their general corpo-
rate actions are guided or determined not by two separate corpo-
rate consciousness, but one." Id.
Clearly the teams of the National League have a common ob-
jective. These ultimate objectives are for the National League as a
single entity to succeed. This objective is achieved by the success of
each individual member team so that quality competition exists on
the playing fields. Furthermore, mechanisms are in place for each
team to succeed. In fact, each team depends upon the economic
success of other teams because a large percentage of monies ob-
tained by individual member teams are divided and shared equally.
(R.App.7-8). Not only do all member teams equally share revenues
derived from several sources but these revenues typically account
for a large part of a member team's income. (R.App.6-7). Pro-
ceeds from the annual All Star Game, playoff games and World Se-
ries games are divided and shared equally among the member
teams. (R.App.7). Additionally, member teams divide the revenues
from nationally televised regular season games. (R.App.7). Finally,
proceeds from the sales of team paraphernalia are also divided
equally among the member teams. (RApp.8). Almost three-
quarters of a team's income is derived from shared revenue
sources. (R.App.8).
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The effect of this significant revenue sharing is that while one
member team can generate substantial revenues from the sale of its
own team's paraphernalia, the revenue from those sales are divided
equally among every other member team. In fact, member teams
have agreed to have the Commissioner of Baseball retain the right
to license the various member teams' paraphernalia. (R.App.8).
These revenue sharing agreements create a strong financial struc-
ture of economic interdependence.
The National League also has mechanisms in place to ensure
that each member team remains in existence for the betterment of
the League. This was illustrated when ownership of the Philadel-
phia Phillies was declared vacant and the team was taken under re-
ceivership by the National League. (R.App.14). Rather than
allowing a member team to fail, the National League supported the
team until a new owner could be found. (R.App.14). These actions
alone are significantly indicative of a single integrated enterprise.
With regard to this Court's requirement of corporate actions
being determined by one consciousness, the National League is
structured so that no one team can act independently without the
consent of the other member teams and the Commissioner of Base-
ball, the overseer of the National League. For instance, according
to the National League's rules and regulations, for any change in a
franchise to occur, a super-majority approval from the owners in
the League is required. (IRApp.14). Additionally, the American
League owners must also approve a change by a super-majority.
(R.App.14). Furthermore, the Commissioner of Baseball has many
individual and supreme powers, including the complete authority
to intervene in such a process by overruling a final decision of the
member teams of the National League. (R.App.14). As the Twelfth
Circuit noted, the Commissioner's supreme powers are exercised
"in the best interests of baseball." (R.App.14).
In addition to the broad and supreme voting powers the Com-
missioner possesses, the Commissioner has the ultimate authority to
negotiate and form all of the national television and radio contracts
that apply to the member teams. (R.App.7). The Commissioner
also controls the operations of the national paraphernalia market-
ing organization. (R.App.7).
Individual team owners lack autonomous control over their re-
spective teams. Every member team of the National League must
act in conformance with the League's rules and regulations. Indi-
vidual teams or owners are not given complete autonomy in con-
ducting the business of baseball, even with respect to an owner's
1995]
15
Georges: Baseball's Exemption from Section One of the Sherman Antitrust Ac
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
182 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM
own team. The League has not only prevented owners from man-
aging their own teams and banned owners from being actively in-
volved with their respective team, but the League, on at least one
occasion, unilaterally stripped an owner of a National League team
because of that owner's conduct and held the team under receiver-
ship until the League found a new owner. (R.App.14).
Actual control over member teams is based upon the structure
of the League, governed by rules and regulations and policed by
the Commissioner of Baseball. A team owner's control is greatly
limited by the Commissioner's plenary authority over each team
and the League. See Milwaukee Am. Ass'n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 299
(N.D. Ill. 1931) (finding the Commissioner of Baseball endowed
"with all the attributes of a benevolent but absolute despot and all
the disciplinary powers of the proverbial pater familias"). "The
Commissioner has general authority, without rules or directives, to
punish both clubs and/or personnel for any act or conduct which,
in his judgment, is 'not in the best interests of baseball' within the
meaning of the Major League Agreement." Atlanta Nat'l League
Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1222 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
The Commissioner himself and not any individual team owner, de-
cides what conduct is not within the "best interests of baseball." Id.
The powers granted or exercised by the Commissioner further
support a determination that, based on control aspects, the mem-
ber teams lack the independence and autonomous control neces-
sary to find a plurality of actors. Any argument that team owners
have ultimate control of a team would be unfounded. Because sec-
tion one of the Sherman Act applies only to distinct and separate
entities and not unilateral conduct, Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768 (cit-
ing Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)), this Court
should reverse the Twelfth Circuit.
In addition, under a Copperweld analysis the National League is
sufficiently unified to constitute a single entity. In Copperweld, this
Court analogized the structure of a single entity as "a multiple team
of horses drawing a vehicle under the control of a single driver."
Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771. This analogy is certainly applicable to
the structure of the National League with each of the fourteen
member teams being the horses, sufficiently controlled by the
League as a whole acting to further the best interests of baseball.
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4. Case law involving other professional sport leagues supports single
entity characterization of the National League.
The ultimate success of each National League team is directly
related to and dependent on the financial success of every other
team in the League. National League teams are therefore not eco-
nomic competitors, but act together as a single business enterprise.
The fact that teams are not economic competitors has already been
found to be true in other professional sport leagues. See Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381,
1391 (9th Cir.) (noting member teams "not true competitors, nor
can they be"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); Smith v. Pro Football,
Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. National Football
League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
The Third Circuit has found that the lack of quantity and qual-
ity of competition existing between member teams of the National
Football League evinces a single entity. Mid-South Grizzlies v. Na-
tional Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 786-87 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984). It is further evidenced by the fact that
individual teams are merely component parts of the League and are
not capable of producing the same product individually. See id.; San
Francisco Seals v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966, 969 (C.D.
Cal. 1974). In evaluating the National Hockey League, a district
court noted that the member teams' objectives are to produce a
sport "so as to assure all members of the league the best financial
return." Id.
The Twelfth Circuit below, in making its decision, relied, in
part, on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Los Angeles Memorial Coli-
seum (R.App.22). However, in that case the Ninth Circuit erred in
its characterization of the member teams of the National Football
League. Under a Coppenweld analysis, the determination of the
Ninth Circuit would have differed, notwithstanding the court's
reliance on the discredited intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.
Rather than finding the member teams sufficiently independent,
the Ninth Circuit would have found member teams of the National
Football League, like the National League, to be ultimately interde-
pendent and therefore a single entity because they share a unity of
interest and purpose. Further, the general corporate actions of
the National League are guided and determined by one conscious-
ness and not individual teams acting independently. The Phoenix
Phillies remain free to produce baseball as a product, but not base-
ball as a National League product. Member teams of the National
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League are wholly interdependent in producing National League
baseball.
Further, the opinion in Los Angeles Memorial was not unani-
mous. The dissenting judge's lengthy opinion presciently applied a
Copperweld analysis to a sports league, concluding that the League
was a single entity by showing that individual teams were unable to
produce a separate and individual service or good and that product
which was produced could only be the result of the joint activities of
all members. Id. at 1403-10 (Williams, J., dissenting in part).
The majority in Los Angeles Memorial noted that section one of
the Sherman Act only applies to competitors which act to eliminate
competition thereby causing harm to consumers. Id. at 1391. The
court immediately proceeded to state that member teams are not
"true competitors, nor can they be." Id. By finding member teams
were not true competitors, the court essentially found there to be a
unity of interest and purpose. If the Ninth Circuit had the benefit
of this Court's Copperweld analysis, this pronouncement would have
weighed heavily in finding that the National Football League consti-
tuted a single entity. Similarly, Justice Rehnquist once stated that
even though individual National Football League teams compete
on the playing field, "they rarely compete in the marketplace."
North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 459 U.S. 1074,
1077 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (finding the structure
of a professional league a matter of necessity for its successful
operation).
C. Valid and Legal Internal Decisions by a Single Entity Should
Be Upheld and Judicial Orders Imposing an Opposite Result
Are Unjust.
1. The National League has been purposefully structured to best achieve
its objectives.
This Court has noted that "a business enterprise should be free
to structure itself in ways that serve efficiency of control, economy
of operations and other factors dictated by business judgment with-
out increasing its exposure to antitrust liability." Copperweld, 467
U.S. at 773. Both this Court and Congress have recognized the
unique nature of baseball. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282
(1972) (recognizing "baseball's unique characteristics and needs");
H.R. Rep. No. 1094, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1992) (distinguishing
baseball from other businesses due to inherent "special public in-
terest obligations"). Just as baseball has been recognized as a
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unique business, the manner in which the National League is struc-
tured is likewise unique.
There are no requirements that all single entities, such as part-
nerships, be uniformly structured. To the contrary, partnerships
are free to allow, for instance, differing profit, loss and liquidation
distributions. This is a fundamental advantage of the partnership
form of business. While some partnerships may distribute profits
or losses on a pro-rata basis, this is certainly not a requirement
of a partnership. Furthermore, revenue may be allocated in a man-
ner inconsistent with a partner's capital contributions and profit
allocation.
Without recounting the history of baseball from the appellate
court's opinion, the appellate court correctly stated that the Na-
tional League has "long maintained strict control over baseball
franchises and players." (R.App.6). The National League was struc-
tured in such a manner to allow team owners to divide the markets
for the production of baseball and control that production and "re-
lated activities [both] on and off the field." (R.App.6). These con-
trol mechanisms permit the League to obtain their objectives,
including the successful economic and athletic promotion of all
member teams.
2. The effect of imposing the will of an applicant to the National
League among the majority of existing member teams violates
the entity's internal decision making structure.
Not only are the Phoenix Phillies asking this Court to order the
sale of a member team of the National League, notwithstanding a
vote against it, but the Phoenix Phillies further seek an order to
move that member team from Philadelphia to Phoenix, Arizona.
When the Phoenix Phillies commenced the negotiations for the
purchase of a member's interest, they were fully aware that the sale
would be contingent on the affirming vote of a super-majority of
other member teams of the National League. The possibility that
the vote would result differently than the Phoenix group would
have liked was of no surprise. While the Phoenix Phillies would not
be able to produce Major League Baseball as a member of the Na-
tional League, the National League did nothing to impede or pro-
hibit the Phoenix group from creating a new league. Entering the
National League, however, required approval from existing member
teams.
If this Court decides in favor of the Phoenix Philies, the conse-
quences to all single entities, regardless of the type of business in-
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volved, would be significant. The National League's long-standing
rules and regulations have been relied upon for many decades.
These rules and regulations determine each member team's rights
with respect to all other member teams and the League. Accepting
the Phoenix Phillies' argument would have the functional effect of
creating and granting a non-League member rights which would be
grossly inconsistent with the National League's rules and regula-
tions. The Phoenix Phillies' petition to this Court to impose the
will of an applicant to a single entity upon the majority of existing
members of that entity should not be rewarded. The organizational
structure of the National League, its management controls and vot-
ing provisions are structured to prevent precisely this type of unwar-
ranted external pressure.
Another purpose of the voting structure is to allow for the effi-
cient operation of the League by having teams placed in optimum
locations. The resulting decisions are internal decisions of a single
entity. If the Phoenix group intended to move the Philadelphia
team to a distant location such as Japan or Mexico City rather than
Phoenix, members of the National League should have the author-
ity to deny such a plan. This Court warned that "[s]ubjecting a sin-
gle firm's every action to judicial scrutiny for reasonableness would
threaten to discourage the competitive enthusiasm that the anti-
trust laws seek to promote." Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 775. A court
imposing the will of a partner upon the majority would render a
majority vote completely ineffective and useless.
The district court properly found that because the National
League constitutes a single entity no section one liability could be
found. Affirming this decision will not prohibit the National
League from being subject to section one liability if the League en-
gages in non-exempt activity or attempts to foreclose parties from
engaging in a competing product. See United States Football League v.
National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988).
D. As Evidenced by the Differing Factual Determinations by the
District and Appellate Courts, a Genuine Issue of Material
Fact Exists and the Proper Procedure Therefore Is to
Remand this Case to the District Court for a Determination
by a Jury.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the mov-
ing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). In this
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context, the term "material" means that a fact has the capacity to
sway the outcome of the litigation under the applicable law. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The court's
responsibility is not to resolve disputed issues of material fact, but to
determine whether there exist any factual issues to be tried. Id. at
247-49. In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, the rec-
ord is examined in the light most favorable to the summary judg-
ment loser and all reasonable inferences are to be resolved in that
party's favor. See Pagano v. Frank, 983 F.2d 343, 347 (1st Cir. 1993).
The standard under which the Court weighs the merits of the mo-
tions does not change simply because cross-motions have been
filed. United States v. Hal, 730 F. Supp. 646, 648 (M.D. Pa. 1990). If
an issue of material fact exists, both summary judgment motions
should fail.
The characterization of a business form as a single entity or
multiple entity and consequently its ability to combine or conspire
in violation of section one of the Sherman Act is a question of fact.
Murray v. Toyota Motor Distrib., Inc., 664 F.2d 1377, 1379 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982). On the basis of the stipulated
facts in the case sub judice, the district court, in the proceedings
below, found the fourteen National League baseball teams to con-
stitute a single entity. (R.4). Upon review of this determination,
the appellate court reversed the single entity characterization and
found the National League susceptible to section one liability.
(R.App.21).
This Court should reverse the Twelfth Circuit's characteriza-
tion. When sufficient evidence exists to declare, as a matter of law,
that individual sport franchises are single entities, such a determi-
nation is appropriate. See, e.g., Williams v. LB. Fischer Nev., 794 F.
Supp. 1026, 1030 (D. Nev. 1992), aff'd, 999 F.2d 445 (9th Cir.
1993). The arguments contained herein present sufficient evi-
dence to reverse the appellate court. Additionally, affirming the
Twelfth Circuit on the single entity determination would effectively
order the move of a Major League Baseball team from Philadelphia
to Phoenix.
If this Court does not believe that reversing the appellate court
is appropriate, this case should be remanded to the district court to
permit ajury to determine the fact question of whether or not the
National League is a single entity. If "reasonable minds" are capa-
ble of finding different results regarding a question of fact, the is-
sue should be decided by a jury. Los Angeles Memorial, 726 F.2d at
1387. Characterizing the teams of the National League as multiple
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and distinct entities as a matter of law when sufficient evidence ex-
ists to enable reasonable minds to differ is inappropriate as a genu-
ine issue of material fact is in dispute.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Petitioners respectfully request
that this Court reverse the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit, or alternatively remand to the
United States District Court for the District of Villanova to permit a
jury to determine the material fact question of whether or not the
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